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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Public Law c. 415, 2007, directed the Maine Labor Relations Board to
study the existing procedures for resolving disputes regarding the calculation of
agency service fees and report back to the Joint Standing Committee on Labor
with recommendations. Board staff researched the constitutional issues raised in
these matters and solicited input from state employees and union officials who had
participated in agency fee dispute proceedings in Maine. Board staff also
reviewed the mechanisms adopted by other states regarding agency fee issues.
The primary objective of this study was to assess whether bringing agency fee
disputes to the Maine Labor Relations Board or the Board of Arbitration and
Conciliation would be an improvement over using private arbitrators.
The bulk of the issues raised by state employees who were dissatisfied by
arbitration of fee disputes through the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
were issues that were a result of not being represented by an attorney and would
have arisen regardless of the forum. Some of the issues of perceived bias were
grounded in a misperception about how arbitrators are chosen in these types of
proceedings and a feeling that AAA should have done more to help out pro se
litigants. None of the specific issues raised to the Board by the fee challengers
would have been resolved by having the dispute heard by a state agency.
In reviewing the experience in Maine so far with agency fee disputes and
the experiences in other jurisdictions, the Board concluded that performing agency
fee adjudication would have a very significant impact on the operations of the
Board, as substantial professional staff time would be consumed by the process.
This would affect the Board's ability to achieve its core mission at a time when the
Board anticipates a significant increase in workload due to the K-12 reorganization enacted in 2007. Given that agency fee objectors always have the option of
pursuing an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Board concludes
that the current system of using an impartial decision maker should remain intact.

INTRODUCTION
A central element of collective bargaining in the U.S. is that the bargaining agent
is the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit and must represent
all of the employees in that unit, even those who are not union members.

A constitu-

tional question arises when the government requires public sector employees who are not
union members to provide financial support to the union to help with the costs of
negotiation and representation. In order to protect those employees' First Amendment
interests in speech and association, any requirement to pay agency service fees in the
public sector must be carefully tailored to minimize the infringement.
Public Law c. 415, 2007, amended Maine's laws to permit employers to deduct
agency service fees from an employee's pay if doing so is required by the collective
bargaining agreement, but prohibits the employer from disciplining or discharging an
employee for failure to pay dues or agency fees. The law also directed the Maine Labor
Relations Board to study the existing procedures for the resolution of disputes regarding
the calculation of the agency fee amount and report back to the Joint Standing Committee
on Labor with recommendations.
In undertaking this study, Board staff solicited input from state employees and
union officials who had participated in agency fee dispute resolution processes in Maine.
Board staff also researched the constitutional issues raised in these matters and the
mechanisms adopted by other states regarding agency service fee issues. This research is
summarized in this report and serves as the basis for the recommendations of the Board
to the Joint Standing Committee on Labor.
The first part of this report summarizes the development of the law on agency fee
issues and the current constitutional requirements. The second part reviews the concerns
raised by the participants. The third part discusses additional factors that must be
considered in evaluating the merits of using a different decision-making forum.
2

PART I: BACKGROUND ON THE LAW AND TYPICAL UNION PROCEDURE
The constitutionality of compelled payrne.nt of agency service fees in the public
sector came before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1977 in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education. 431 U.S. 209. The Supreme Court concluded that the public policy of
fostering labor peace through the collective bargaining process applies equally in both the
private and the public sectors and that unions have a legitimate interest in addressing the
free-rider issue. Abood, 431 U.S. at 224. The Court also held that nonunion public sector
employees have a constitutional right to prevent the union from using a part of their
required service fee for political or ideological matters unrelated to the union's role as
collective bargaining agent. By limiting mandatory "fair share" fees to financing the
bargaining agent's activities in collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment, the governmental interest of labor peace is furthered without
significant infringement of First Amendment rights. Abood, 431 U.S. at 225.
In an Opinion of the Justices issued in 1979, the Justices of Maine's Supreme
Judicial Court considered the constitutionality of fair share fees, reviewed Abood, and
stated that "nothing in the Constitution of Maine requires a different conclusion."
Opinion of the Justices, 401A.2d135, 146. The Maine Labor Relations Board has issued
only two opinions addressing fair share fees, both in the early 1980's. The Board
concluded that fair share fees were permitted by both the State and the Municipal
Employee Labor Relations Laws and were a mandatory subject of bargaining. Council
74, AFSCME v. City of Bangor, MLRB No. 80-50 at 4 (Sept. 22, 1980), rev 'don other
grounds, City of Bangor v. Council 74, AFSCME, CV-80-563 (Me. Super. Ct., Pen. Cty.,
June 11, 1981 ); City ofBangor v. Bangor Fire Fighters Assoc., MLRB No. 83-06 at 19
(Aug. 2, 1983).
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, in
which it identified the minimum procedural safeguards a union must employ to protect
3

nonmembers' First Amendment interests. The Hudson Court held that,
the constitutional requirements for the Union's collection of agency fees
include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably
prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while
such challenges are pending.
475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986).
With respect to the first item, the Hudson Court stated that the nonmember must
"be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union's fee", and reiterated
that the union bears the burden of proving the amount of expenditures for collective
bargaining and contract administration. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306. Regarding the second
item, the Hudson Court did not indicate what "reasonably prompt" means, but did state
that "an expeditious arbitration might satisfy the requirement of a reasonably prompt
decision by an impartial decisionmaker, so long as the arbitrator's selection did not
represent the Union's unrestricted choice." Hudson, 475 U.S. at 308, n. 21. The escrow
requirement ensures that those funds in dispute are not available to the union while the
matter is being resolved. Hudson, 75 U.S. at 309.
The Supreme Court provided some guidance on what particular activities can be
can be considered "chargeable" to agency fee payors the 1991 Lehnert decision. Lehnert
v. Ferris Faculty Ass 'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). The three point test applied by the Court

majority is that for an activity to be chargeable it must: I) be "germane" to collective
bargaining activities, 2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor
peace and avoiding "free riders" and 3) not significantly add to the burdening of free
speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop." Lehnert, 500 U.S. at
519.
As a final note, the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that an arbitrator's
decision would not bind a court if a challenger filed an action in federal court under 42
4

U.S.C. §1983. Hudson, at 308, n. 12. The judgment of an arbitrator or a state agency
will not control the decision of a court on constitutional matters. The Supreme Court
held more recently that an objecting employee who did not agree to submit the fee
dispute to arbitration could not be required to exhaust the arbitral remedy before
proceeding with a claim in federal court. Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866
(1998).
The minimum constitutional safeguards established by the Supreme Court have
been applied by state and federal courts over the years in a more or less uniform way.
Consequently, most national unions have established procedures that meet the basic
Hudson requirements. This process typically involves:

1. On a regular basis (usually each fiscal year), the union produces a financial
report that breaks expenditures down into major categories of expenses, verified by an
independent auditor.
2. The union then determines which expenses are chargeable to agency fee payers
and which are nonchargeable expenses. The amount of the agency fee is then calculated.
3. Before the agency fee requirement is implemented, the union sends a notice to
all nonmembers, which includes the financial information and the basis for the agency fee
calculation and an explanation of how a nonmember can object to the calculation of the
fee.
4. The union establishes a procedure for resolving disputes regarding the
calculation of the fee and sets up an escrow account to hold disputed fees while
challenges are resolved. Typically, an arbitrator is selected (not by the union) from the
American Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, or a
similar panel of neutrals. The union's procedure typically will establish a time frame
within which a nonmember must submit his or her objection, how multiple challengers
5

will be heard in a consolidated case, how escrow procedures will work, and other
procedural matters. The union must pay the full cost of such a dispute resolution
mechanism and bears the burden of proving the validity of the agency fee amount.

PART II: DISCUSSION OF COMMENTS FROM FEE CHALLENGERS
The 2003-2005 collective bargaining agreements between the Executive Branch of
State government and MSEA and AFSCME were the first to impose a mandatory service
fee upon non-member bargaining unit employees; however, the fee was applied only
prospectively and employees hired prior to the imposition of the fee were
"grandfathered" from coverage. In the successor collective bargaining agreements,
covering the period from 2005-2007, the parties agreed that payment of the service fee
would be a condition of continued employment for all non-member unit employees,
regardless of when they were hired. That requirement was continued in the parties'
2007-2009 agreements.
In July, 2005, the MSEA sent Hudson notices to all employees included in the
Executive Branch bargaining units it represents. The notice included a detailed
explanation of chargeable and non-chargeable categories, an audited statement of the
exact dollar amount spent in each category, a copy of the independent auditor's report,
and a notice of the right to challenge the amount of the service fee by August 16, 2005.
Thirty-five non-member unit employees filed challenges, an arbitrator was appointed by
the American Arbitration Association, three days of hearing were held. The arbitrator
issued a decision on May 4, 2006, holding that the union had sustained its burden of
establishing that the fee assessed reflected the per capita share of chargeable costs, as
defined by applicable law.
A similar process was followed regarding the union's 2006-07 and 2007-08
service fee assessments. On June 27, 2006, the union issued a Hudson notice, eight-six
6

unit employees filed challenges, an arbitrator was appointed and hearings were held
between January and July, 2007. A decision was pending on September 19, 2007, when
Board staff met with some of the fee objectors and challengers. For 2007-08, the Hudson
notice was issued on June 22, 2007, forty-two persons filed challenges, an arbitrator was
appointed, and hearings commenced in February, 2008.
The comments discussed in this section were offered by employees who had
participated in the fee challenge procedure, as well as from at least one person who
objected to payment of the fee but had not formally challenged the fee amount. These
comments were submitted to the MLRB's Executive Director via letters and e-mail in
response to a request for comments. These issues were also discussed during an open
meeting held with MLRB staff on September 19, 2007.
A. Concerns Regarding the Selection and Use of AAA Arbitrators
The provision in the four current collective bargaining agreements between the
Executive Branch and MSEA which creates the service fee obligation is Article 65. The
dispute resolution section of that article states as follows:
7.

Disputes

The amount of the service fee shall be subject to review pursuant to
the American Arbitration Association's Rules for Impartial Determination
of Union Fees. Pending resolution of any such dispute, the disputed amount
of fees shall be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account. MSEA-SEIU
shall pay for any maintenance fees associated with such escrow accounts.
The State shall not be liable for any fees, costs, damages, expenses, or any
other form of liability involved with regard to such escrow accounts.
MSEA-SEIU is solely responsible for payment of the fee charged by
AAA for the cost of providing necessary administrative services. The
arbitrator will be compensated by MSEA-SEIU, in accordance with the perdiem rate currently on file for that arbitrator with the AAA, and shall be
reimbursed for expenses by MSEA-SEIU. Attorneys' fees, witness fees, and
other expenses shall be borne by the respective parties. No fees, costs,
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damages, expenses, or other form of liability involved with regard to
arbitration shall be borne by the State.
In the event a dispute under this Article is submitted to arbitration,
the arbitrator shall have no power or authority to order the State to pay such
service fee on behalf of any employee.
In the event a change in law requires that this type of dispute be
resolved in a forum other than an arbitration under the auspices of the
American Arbitration Association, the dispute resolution procedure will
comply with law. All portions of this Article that are unaffected by the
change in forum will remain in full force and effect.
The fee challengers have expressed several concerns regarding the assignment of
fee dispute arbitrators through the American Arbitration Association (referred to as
"AAA"). A number of the comments received by the Board suggested that the AAA as
an organization was biased. One fee objector asserted that there is no chance for an
impartial fee dispute arbitration process as long as the AAA is the only source of
arbitrators. The challengers pointed out that the AAA Board of Directors included 13
union officials or union lawyers. The challengers thought this union block could
potentially dominate the governance of the organization. The MLRB does not see such a
risk, as the AAA Board in 2006 consisted of 100 persons, including management
lawyers, corporate officers, and academics, in addition to union-affiliated individuals.
Part of the fee challengers' dissatisfaction is based on the fact that they had no
input in the selection of the arbitrator that would hear and decide the fee challenge
dispute. The selection process in agency fee dispute cases is different than the process
used in grievance cases. The standard procedure in grievance cases is that, if the parties
have not agreed on an arbitrator, AAA prepares a list of names from their panel of labor
arbitrators and then each party strikes any name to which it objects and numbers the
remaining names in order of preference. AAA then appoints an arbitrator from among
the persons who have been approved by both sides. In contrast, in agency fee disputes,
AAA appoints an arbitrator without any prior input from the union or the challengers,
8

although there is an opportunity to object for cause after the appointment. The comments
received by the Board regarding the selection process suggest that some of the objectors
were dissatisfied with the process due to a misperception that the union had selected the
arbitrator.
The rationale for the selection process in agency fee disputes became clear in the
Board staffs discussion with the objectors who attended the September 19 meeting. The
challengers come from all parts of the state and the group is diverse as to grounds for
challenge--from philosophical objectors opposed to any payment, to those who are
willing to pay but question the basis for the fee being imposed. Getting them to agree on
selecting a particular arbitrator would be extremely time consuming, if not impossible.
While at least some of the challengers have been represented by counsel in the arbitration
process, others have not, and there is no reasonable way to get them to speak through one
voice as a group. Having AAA make the selection allows the process to start much more
quickly. An analogous situation under Maine law authorizes the AAA to select a neutral
arbitrator for purposes of interest arbitration if the parties are unable to do so. 26
M.R.S.A. § 965(4)('1! 3).
Another objection received is that many of the arbitrators have had long histories
of working as arbitrators in disputes involving MSEA. Consequently, the feeling is that
these arbitrators have a significant bias and the outcome will be shaped by a desire to
maintain their prospects for future work with MSEA on grievance or interest arbitration
cases. The AAA rules permit any party to object to the arbitrator selected in a fee dispute
case as soon as the appointment is made. When the bargaining agent notifies AAA of the
agency fee dispute, it provides AAA with a list of the names and addresses of the fee
challengers. AAA then selects an arbitrator from among those experienced labor
arbitrators who have agreed to be available to do this type of work, notifies all of the
parties of the name of the arbitrator, and provides them the arbitrator's resume. Rule 4 of
9

the AAA fee dispute arbitration rules states that, "[a]fter the parties in the procedure are
notified of an appointment, they may challenge an arbitrator for cause by notifying the
AAA of their objection" and the AAA may disqualify an arbitrator.
It appears that the basis for at least some of the concerns discussed above comes

from a publication of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation titled, The
American Arbitration Association: Preserving Big Labor's Forced-Unionism Agenda by
Undermining Supreme Court Doctrine, a copy of which was supplied to the Board by one
of the challengers. The National Right to Work Foundation has been a leader in
opposing the mandatory payment of union service fees for many years. Despite the fact
that the Foundation-supplied attorneys have been involved in numerous legal challenges
to agency fees over the years, the Foundation does not cite any federal or state court
holding that the arbitral process failed to meet the constitutional requirement of an
"impartial decisionmaker" merely because an arbitrator had been selected by the AAA
pursuant to their Rules for Impartial Determination of Union Fees. The Board's research
also failed to produce any court decision.
AAA's rules provide that the arbitrator will be selected from a special panel of
arbitrators experienced in labor relations who are willing to work on fee dispute cases and
are prepared to meet the applicable time limits. Evaluating the bargaining agent's
chargeability determinations requires expertise in the collective bargaining process,
particularly for those expenses whose chargeability is not clearly established through
existing precedent. The decision-maker must know generally how unions operate, and
must understand the nature and scope of their statutory representational duties and
responsibilities in order to review the status of contested expenditures. It is this Board's
understanding that the overwhelming majority of experienced labor arbitrators who work
in Maine (and in New England) are members of the Labor Arbitration Panel of the AAA.
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Excluding arbitrators merely because of their affiliation with AAA would effectively
preclude from consideration those experienced neutrals who could best do the work.
Having either the BAC or the MLRB hear and decide service fee disputes would
not address the fee challengers' concerns regarding their lack of input in the selection of
the decision-maker. Both the BAC and the MLRB are comprised of a neutral chair, an
employee representative and an employer representative and two alternates for each
primary member. Both boards function as tri-partite panels consisting of one person from
each member category. Traditionally, members and alternates all serve on panels on an
informal rotation and based on their respective availability; however, the primary
members usually sit on particularly important cases. The only input parties have
regarding the members serving on a particular case is the right to challenge individual
members for cause, as is currently the case with the fee dispute arbitrator appointed by
AAA. Furthermore, some of the same perceived issues would arise ifthe BAC were to
decide fee dispute cases since two of the three neutral chairs who currently serve on the
BAC also offer dispute resolution services privately and accept labor arbitration work.

B. Concerns Regarding Discovery and Other Pre-hearing Issues
1. Challengers' Discovery Issues

Fee challengers who have been very involved in the fee dispute arbitration process
outlined a number of concerns regarding the process through which they and others
gained access to the bargaining agent's records while preparing their cases for arbitration.
Before addressing these concerns, it will be helpful to describe briefly the discovery
process in courts, in arbitration, and with the MLRB.
In trial practice before the courts, the rules of civil procedure provide a structured
avenue for each party to obtain facts and information from the other party about the basis
of the dispute. This information-gathering process is called discovery and it includes
11

interrogatories, depositions, requests for production of documents and other evidence.
The purpose of discovery is to simplify the matters in dispute and assist the parties in
preparing for trial. The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure have 12 separate rules regarding
the discovery process.
In the typical grievance arbitration case where the dispute turns on the
interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement, there is generally
no right or necessity for discovery. The parties have attempted to resolve their dispute
through at least one or two levels of the grievance procedure prior to arbitration and have
learned the bases of their respective positions that way. Furthermore, under the general
principles of collective bargaining law, the employer is obligated to provide the union
with the information necessary to process grievances.
The AAA service fee dispute resolution rules discuss evidence and the production
of evidence in the following 2 rules:
14. Evidence
The parties may offer such evidence as they desire and shall produce such
additional evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and
determination of the dispute. The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevance and
materiality of the evidence offered and conformity to legal rules of evidence shall
not be necessary.
15. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of Documents
The arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit,
giving it only such weight as seems proper after consideration of any objection
made to its admission. Parties shall be afforded an opportunity to examine all
documents submitted in the proceedings. Documents not filed with the arbitrator at
the hearing, but which are arranged to be submitted later, shall be filed with the
AAA for transmission to the arbitrator.

12

It is important to remember that the union bears the burden of proving that the

service fee is based on only those activities that can be legitimately charged to objecting
nonmembers.
As the AAA rule cited above indicates, it is up to the arbitrator to decide whether
to require a party to produce a requested document. Over the course of three successive
agency service fee proceedings involving MSEA and the challengers, an approach to prehearing discovery has evolved.
In the first round of service fee dispute arbitration in 2005, no pre-hearing
procedures were in place, resulting in eleventh-hour, piecemeal requests by the fee
challengers for volumes of information. As the parties gained experience with the
process, they sought the establishment of discovery, through pre-hearing procedural
motions presented to the arbitrator. The pre-hearing procedural order for the 2006 case
set forth a process through which fee challengers identified in writing the documents
sought to be reviewed; set deadlines for the receipt of such requests; established three
specific work weeks when up to three challengers at a time could examine and copy the
documents sought; set a deadline for the union to identify its likely witnesses and a
deadline for the challengers to identify any union staff member that they wished to call as
a witness; and provided a mechanism through which the union's refusal to give any
challenger access to any requested information would be reviewed by the arbitrator at the
hearing.
More substantively, two challengers stated that the union had refused their
requests to inspect the daily planners of union employees. Paragraph 2 of the procedural
rules adopted by the arbitrator in the 2006 proceeding stated:
In response to requests for information that can be obtained from
existing documents, or requests for specific existing documents, MSEASEIU will provide access to the documents containing the information, or
13

to the specified documents, at our offices at 65 State Street Augusta, Maine,
provided that the requested information or identified documents are
relevant to the issues presented in this arbitration.
In any system of impartial dispute resolution, neither party has an absolute right to

demand the production of documents or to refuse such production. Rule 14 of the AAA
service fee arbitration rules quoted above provides the challengers with the opportunity to
raise the union's refusal to allow inspection of the employee planners with the arbitrator.
The arbitrator would require the production of evidence if the arbitrator considered it
"necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute." It is not clear that the
challengers pursued this option.
Some of the other concerns raised by the challengers regarding the discovery
process centered on the difficulties faced in trying to review the relevant documents at the
offices of MSEA, particularly for those who live and work a significant distance from
Augusta. One challenger also asserted that the union should be required to pay for the
copies of documents that the challengers actually introduced at the arbitration proceeding.
There is nothing unique about AAA that creates these particular issues; they arise in any
dispute resolution system.
Having either the MLRB or the BAC hear and decide fee disputes would not
substantially address the fee challengers' concerns regarding pre-hearing discovery.
Neither the MLRB nor the BAC provides the full scope of discovery available in the
courts. The MLRB 's prohibited practice complaint process includes a formal pre-hearing
conference where each party is required to identify and provide copies of all documents
the party intends to offer at the hearing. No additional documents may be presented into
evidence, unless they were not available to the party seeking to offer them at the prehearing conference or they were not known to exist at that time. The chair of the BAC
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assigned on a case can convene a pre-hearing conference on disputed discovery
questions; however, this rarely occurs.
Pre-hearing discovery before both panels essentially consists of the subpoena
process. If a party learns that the other party has documents believed to be relevant and
important to the determination of the issue in dispute and if the other party is unwilling to
produce the documents voluntarily, the party seeking access requests issuance of a
subpoena by the panel chair. Typically, the subpoena is issued and is returnable at the
pre-hearing conference.
If a party objects to production of the witness or documents that are the subject of

the subpoena, the party files an objection with the executive director, setting forth the
legal and factual reasons why the subpoena should be quashed. The parties present their
respective arguments regarding the merits of the motion at the pre-hearing conference.
Usually, the issue is decided by the Board Chair at the pre-hearing conference, but
sometimes it is presented to the full panel. As a general rule, decisions are based on
relevance, availability of alternative sources of the information sought, and respect for
rules of privilege and the privacy interests of individuals.

2. The Fee Challengers' Difficulty in Coordinating Their Efforts
A concern expressed by a couple of challengers was that they had had difficulty
communicating with and coordinating their appeal with that of the other challengers. At
the outset of the process, the bargaining agent forwards the names and addresses of the
challengers to the AAA. The AAA sends each fee challenger a packet that includes the
names and addresses of the other challengers. From that point, the nature and extent of
interaction among the challengers is up to each individual. One challenger opined that
home telephone numbers and e-mail addresses should also have been provided; however,
the bargaining agent may not have access to such information. In addition, some might
view such information as private, and not for distribution.
15

Utilizing the contact information provided by the AAA, the challengers are free to
communicate with each other by mail and to coordinate their activities by use of e-mail
or through meetings. Information provided by challengers to the Board indicates that
they have done so. While coordination among the challengers would be helpful to them
and contribute to the efficiency of the process, the challengers and the bargaining agent
have described the arbitration as being comprised of separate cases, one for each
individual challenger, which have been consolidated for purposes of hearing and
decision. Each challenger has the right to present evidence, to examine and crossexamine witnesses, and to present argument. This approach of consolidating each
litigant's separate case with those of similarly situated parties for purposes of hearing and
decision is the same process the MLRB or the BAC would use.

3. The Denial of Administrative Leave
A number of challengers noted that they are required to conduct discovery and
attend arbitration hearings during the normal work day and that works a hardship on
them. During the first round of the challenge process, the employer gave the challengers
paid administrative leave for time spent attending arbitration hearings; but that has not
occurred in either the 2006 or the 2007 rounds of fee arbitration proceedings.
The position of the challengers was that, since the State created the service fee
obligation through their agreement with the bargaining agent and because the objectors'
interests at stake are First Amendment rights, the employer should be legally obligated to
provide administrative leave to those actually attending the arbitration hearing. Under
the American system of justice, including practice before the courts, before
administrative agencies, or in arbitration, each party bears the cost of preparing and
presenting their respective cases; hence, this concern is inherent in our dispute resolution
processes, and is not unique to AAA.
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C. Concerns Regarding the Hearing Process
1. Understanding the Legal Standard for Determining Chargeability

Fee challengers presented concerns regarding the nature of the evidence required
to substantiate the amount of the service fee as well as questions regarding whether
particular items are chargeable. One challenger contended that there did not appear to be
any controlling standards regarding chargeability determinations. Subsequent to the
Supreme Court's decision in Abood, many federal courts have issued decisions regarding
the chargeability of particular types of expenditures - that is, whether they can lawfully
be included in the service fee charged to non-members. While such decisions are not
consistent on all issues, many issues have been settled and are no longer in dispute. It is
difficult, especially for a prose litigant, to digest the myriad of court decisions on these
issues and form a coherent and articulable understanding of what is chargeable.
For those topics whose chargeability has not been conclusively established, the
Supreme Court has provided some general guidance for making the determination. In

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, a majority of the Justices endorsed the following
three-part test: chargeable activities must be germane to collective bargaining, they must
be warranted by the governmental interest in promoting labor peace and avoiding "free
riders," and they must not significantly add to the burden on free speech that is inherent
in allowing an agency fee at all. Lehnert, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991). The Lehnert Court
went on to define "germane" expenditures as those which are "substantively" related to
collective bargaining and "for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the
members of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization."

Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524.
In some respects, the Lehnert decision is not very helpful because there was no
majority opinion on certain key issues and there were different majorities on different
subjects. It is possible that greater clarity will be forthcoming as the Supreme Court is
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poised to address the chargeability issue for the first time since Lehnert was decided in
1991. In a case involving a group of Maine state employees challenging the agency fee
amount set by MSEA, the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals held that costs of litigation
occurring outside of the bargaining unit were chargeable if the litigation satisfies the
germaneness test described in Lehnert that applies to other pooled resources. Locke v.

Karass, 498 F.3d 49, 66 (1st Cir. Aug. 8, 2007). There is inconsistency among the
Circuit Courts on this particular issue. The Supreme Court granted the petitions for writ
of certiorari in mid-February of2008, but it will not be argued until the Supreme Court
term beginning in October of2008.
Judicial precedent controlling the chargeability of a specific activity, or the above
standards in cases where there is no such precedent, must be applied by the decisionmaker in fee disputes, whether that be an arbitrator, a judge or an administrative agency.
In addition, the challengers always have the right to litigate the union's fee calculation in
a federal-court action, regardless of whether the challenger has gone to arbitration. Air

Line Pilots Association v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998). Thus, the difficulty in navigating
this confusing legal field will be the same regardless of the forum used.

2. Evidentiary Issues iu Agency Fee Dispute Resolution Processes
Some of the challengers were dissatisfied with the process because they felt the
arbitrator should have required more detailed evidence from the union. There are two
stages at which the Union must provide financial information regarding the agency fee
amount: in the notice sent to nonmembers and later in proving to the arbitrator that the
fee is based on chargeable expenses. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that,
although the nonunion employee has the burden of raising an objection to the amount of
the service fee, the union has the burden of proof regarding the issue. Abood, 431 U.S. at
239-240; Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306. Hudson requires that the notice contain sufficient
information to allow a non-member to decide whether to object to the calculation of the
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service fee amount. If a challenge is filed, the union must prove that the fee will only
fund constitutionally permissible activities.
In Hudson, the Supreme Court described in a footnote the type and level of
information that is constitutionally required to be given to non-members to enable them
to decide whether to object to the amount of the service fee. The Court stated:
We continue to recognize that there are practical reasons why "[a]bsolute
precision" in the calculation of the charge to nonmembers cannot be
"expected or required." [Railway Clerks v.} Allen, 373 U.S., at 122, quoted
in Abood, 431 U.S., at 239-240, n. 40. Thus, for instance, the Union cannot
be faulted for calculating its fee on the basis of its expenses during the
preceding year. The Union need not provide nonmembers with an
exhaustive and detailed list of all its expenditures, but adequate disclosure
surely would include the major categories of expenses, as well as
verification by an independent auditor. With respect to an item such as the
Union's payment of $2,167,000 to its affiliated state and national labor
organizations, seen. 4, supra, for instance, either a showing that none of it
was used to subsidize activities for which nonmembers may not be charged,
or an explanation of the share that was so used was surely required.
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307, n. 18. There is a difference of opinion among the Federal
Courts of Appeals as to whether this reference in the footnote to "verification by an
independent auditor" means that a CPA-conducted audit is required. Providing one, as
MSEA has done, meets the higher standard among those courts. It should be noted that
Certified Public Accountants are licensed and regulated by the State of Maine and, by
producing and subscribing to an audit report, the auditors not only place the firm's
reputation but also their State licensure on the line.
At the hearing, the union must produce documentary and testimonial evidence to
support the figures used to calculate the agency fee amount. "Absolute precision" is not
required in the calculation of the fee. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307, n. 18, citing Railway
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963). MSEA, as unions typically do, offered the
testimony of its CPA, its Chief Financial Officer, and various union officials and
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personnel on the fee calculation process. The union offered contemporaneous records
from its time and accounting system to corroborate its calculation. If the challengers
disagree with the testimony of any witness presented by the union, they have the
opportunity to challenge the witness on cross-examination or to present witnesses of their
own to rebut that testimony. The challengers may disagree with the conclusions of the
auditor and decide that offering their own expert witness is called for. The challengers
may present evidence or elicit testimony regarding the facts or circumstances of
particular expenditures in order to rebut the union's assertion that the expense is
chargeable. The evidence presented by the challengers will be considered by the
arbitrator in determining whether the union has met its burden of proof. The Union's
burden is to establish the amount of the fee through relevant evidence, while the
challengers' role is to call the evidence into question. Those roles are the same regardless
of the forum.
3. Concern Regarding an Effective Subpoena Power in Arbitration
One concern raised by the challengers arose because a union employee
subpoenaed by the challengers failed to show up to testify at the arbitration hearing. The
challenger asserted that there was no effective means for securing the attendance of
witnesses at the arbitration proceeding. In that instance, a challenger wanted to question
a certain union employee who had been convicted of theft 15 years earlier to inquire
whether the individual handled union funds. The arbitrator issued a subpoena for the
individual's attendance at the arbitration; however, the person failed to attend and, as
described by the challenger "nothing happened." The arbitrator noted in his decision that
the fee challengers made no request for additional hearing time to allow them to enforce
the subpoena. Earlier in his decision, the arbitrator had stated that the questioning of the
witnesses was done by various fee challengers. Thus, it appears that the fee challengers
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were not assisted by counsel during the hearing. Evidently, the fee challengers were not
aware of the option to seek enforcement of the subpoena in court.
Neither the Board of Arbitration and Conciliation or the Maine Labor Relations
Board enforces their own subpoenas. Both panels have the statutory authority to issue
subpoenas requiring persons to attend hearings and to bring relevant documents. In
practice, both boards differentiate between subpoenas issued at the request of a party and
those issued on the board's own initiative, the latter of which has not occurred within the
last 15 years. No subpoenaed witness has failed to appear before either board in the last
25 years. If a subpoenaed witness failed to appear before the BAC or the MLRB, the
party on whose behalf the subpoena had been issued would have the option of requesting
that the hearing be adjourned to permit that party the opportunity to secure enforcement
of the subpoena by a court, pursuant to the Maine Uniform Arbitration Act (14 M.R.S.A.
§ 5933(1)) or the Maine Administrative Procedure Act (5 M.R.S.A. § 9060), respectively.

In the event that the subpoena had been issued on the initiative of either board, the
applicable statutes authorize the board to seek enforcement of the subpoena by the court.
In light of this, it is doubtful that the challengers would gain anything with respect to
enforcement of subpoenas if the fee dispute hearing were held by the BAC or the MLRB
rather than an arbitrator.

PART III: ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Many of the Comments Received Reflect the Challengers' Pro Se Status
Many of the concerns expressed by the challengers are typical of those expressed
by pro se litigants in proceedings with the Maine Labor Relations Board and with similar
quasi-judicial administrative agencies.
One challenger stated that the AAA case manager was hard to reach and refused to
answer even simple procedural questions. Among the questions the challengers had
were: what to expect at the hearing, how is evidence presented, how many copies of
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exhibits must be provided, and whether briefs are required. The challenger claimed that,
essentially, AAA was unwilling to provide procedural guidance to pro se litigants. In
evaluating the information disseminated by AAA staff in this context, one must keep in
mind that the arbitrator determines the specific procedures in each case. As the
administrative staff for the organization, the AAA case manager may very well not know
the details of the individual arbitrator's case-processing orders. The same challenger who
voiced the concern regarding the accessibility of the AAA case manager has also
frequently contacted the MLRB concerning the current fee arbitration process. This
person, like most pro se litigants and others unfamiliar with legal practice, has had
difficulty differentiating between procedural questions (how to do something) and
questions seeking substantive legal advice.
In the MLRB 's experience, the procedural and substantive difficulties with the
discovery process voiced by the fee challengers are those typically encountered by prose
litigants. Although practice before the MLRB as well as in arbitration involves fewer
procedural and evidentiary rules than the courts, parties represented by experienced
counsel have an advantage. Counsel generally know the rules, understand the legal basis
for the rules, are experienced in agency practice and procedures, and utilize this expertise
to the advantage of the party they represent. Much of the frustration with the process
expressed by the challengers may abate as they become more experienced with it. For
example, in the first round of service fee arbitration the challengers were totally
unfamiliar with the process and there was no organized pre-hearing discovery. In later
rounds, building on their experience, the challengers have been able to file comprehensive procedural motions and detailed requests for _the production of documents.
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B. The MLRB May Have Authority Over the Implementation of Agency Fees but
the Board Has No Expertise in Deciding Constitutional Questions.
While the MLRB has not issued a decision on this point, it is likely that the Board
would consider the failure of a union to comply with the requirements of Hudson to be a
violation of the collective bargaining law insofar as it constitutes interference with an
employee's right not to join or participate in union activities. Consequently, although the
Board would not get into an analysis of whether the fee amount was based only on
chargeable expenses, the Board would consider whether the notice was sufficient, and
whether the union established adequate procedures for escrow and for resolving
challenges to the fee amount. Thus, the Board appears to have authority to oversee the
process of implementing agency service fees pursuant to the Board's prohibited practice
complaint jurisdiction.
The MLRB has the statutory authority to enforce the collective bargaining laws
that grant specific rights to public employees and public employers. The MLRB does not
have any authority, express or implied, to use its enforcement authority to protect First
Amendment rights. As the agency charged with enforcing the collective bargaining
statutes, a court will accord the Board's decisions substantial deference in recognition of
the Board's expertise and experience administering the labor relations statutes. In
disputes over the amount of service fees chargeable to non-union members, the
challengers' First Amendment rights are at issue, and the Board has no special expertise
deciding this type of dispute. Furthermore, if a federal court is presented with a fee
dispute case presented as a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court would hear the matter
de novo and decide it as charged, regardless of the disposition of the issue at a state
agency or at arbitration. Thus, having the MLRB or the BAC decide agency fee disputes
would offer no legal advantage.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
It is not impossible for the Maine Labor Relations Board to hear and decide

disputes regarding the amount of union service fees lawfully charged to non-members,
but it would not be possible to do so with current staff without affecting the Board's
ability to achieve its core mission. A few other states have opted to authorize a labor
relations agency to do agency fee dispute work, although no state has taken on this
responsibility since the mid 1980's. Many of the state agencies that adjudicate agency
fee disputes have a different organization or statutory authority than the MLRB. For
example, some are directly involved in resolving contractual disputes and some regulate
aspects of the unions' internal operations. (See Appendix.)
This review of the current fee dispute arbitration process has established no
compelling rationale to change the current system. Several of the concerns expressed by
the fee challengers are typical observations from prose litigants, reflecting issues that are
inherent in any system of dispute resolution. These concerns would not be addressed by
having the MLRB or the BAC set the amount of the service fee.
Furthermore, since fee challengers' First Amendment speech and associational
rights are involved, they may contest the bargaining agent's collection of mandatory fees
in the federal courts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to disputes about the
process of implementing agency service fees, the challengers would likely be able to file
a prohibited practice complaint with the Board under current law.
In conclusion, the Maine Labor Relations Board recommends that the current
mechanism remain intact.

26

APPENDIX
AGENCY FEE DISPUTE MECHANISMS IN OTHER STATES

The following is a summary of how various states regulate major issues related to
agency fee provisions. The three areas reviewed are:
•

whether the state labor relations board is involved with the process for
authorizing or de-authorizing agency fee provisions;

•

whether the state board enforces any statutory provisions regarding the
notice a union must give regarding the agency fee;

•

whether the state board performs the role of the "impartial decision maker"
regarding disputes on the amount of the agency fee.

This is not intended to be an exhaustive review of how all states deal with these issues
but more of an illustration of the variety of approaches taken. The statutes of twentythree states were reviewed for mention of agency fee issues and agency regulations and
case law were considered to the extent available on line. 1 Some agencies were contacted
directly for further information.
1. Authorization Required for Agency Fees

There is no constitutional requirement that a state enact legislation in order to
authorize agency fee agreements or to protect the First Amendment rights of public sector
employees subject to such agreements. Nonetheless, many states have adopted statutes to
address the issues raised by agency fee provisions or to highlight the constitutional
requirements. The approaches taken vary from state to state in very significant respects.
Maine's statutes do not directly require the payment of a service fee, but allow the
public employer and the bargaining agent to agree to such a requirement and a
1

None of the 22 states identified as "right to work" states by the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation website were reviewed. Of the remaining states, five (Kentucky, Colorado,
Missouri, Indiana and West Virginia) were not reviewed because of very limited or non-existent
collective bargaining rights in the public sector.
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Hudson requirements is interference with an employee's right to refrain from
participating in union activities.
Regardless of the level of detail provided in the state's statutes, they are
interpreted in a manner that makes them consistent with the First Amendment
requirements articulated in Hudson. If a state does regulate this area, the state will often
set minimum time periods in which a nonmember can review the contents of the notice
before having to object to paying the full amount or challenge the fee. Similarly, a state's
statute might provide more detail about the contents of the notice than Hudson suggests
and may touch on any of the following areas:
Definition of Agency Fee. While the issue of what expenses can be considered
chargeable is a constitutional question, how a statute defines agency fee has an impact on
what steps a nonmember must take to exercise their First Amendment rights. In a few
states, "agency fee" means dues less the costs of benefits available only to members.
Nonmembers are notified that they must pay the agency fee but they can "object" to
paying that portion of the fee that goes to non-chargeable expenses. An "objector" may
also "challenge" the calculation of the non-chargeable expenses. 2 A simpler approach
limits the agency fee amount to only chargeable expenses, as in Maine's statute.
Timing of Notice. Hudson requires the union to provide a notice to nonmembers
of the fee amount and to have a procedure for resolving disputes about the fee amount.
There are a number of timing issues, some of which depend upon the definition of agency
fee used in the statute. The first is the time that must elapse after the Hudson notice is
issued and before the first payroll deduction is allowed. This varies from 14 days

2

This is comparable to the system in Hudson: nonmembers are notified of the amount
owed by nonmembers, the portion of that amount that is due from those who object to paying for
political or ideological expenditures. Those nonmembers who object within the required time
frame will only have pay that proportion that is chargeable. In addition, objectors must be given
an opportunity to challenge the calculation of that amount. The Hudson Court noted that the
nonmember has the obligation to object, and the union has the burden of proving the validity of
the calculation.
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(Illinois) to 45 days (Pennsylvania). A 30-day period seems to be common (New Jersey,
California, Minnesota). There is also the time within which a nonmember must object to
paying the full amount, which, as noted above, is not applicable ifthe amount owed by
all nonmembers is limited to the chargeable expenses. Finally, there is the time within
which the nonmember must challenge the calculation of the agency fee. Oftentimes, the
statute sets a minimum time frame within which the non-member must challenge the
calculation of the fee--30 days is common. When the state statute specifies any of these
time periods, the state is imposing a policy choice not specifically required by Hudson.
Manner of Notice. Some states specify in either statute or regulations that written

notice be mailed to the home address of all employees obligated to pay the agency fee
(Minnesota) while other states' only requirement is that the notice be written (California).
Illinois regulations require the employer to provide access to bulletin boards for this
notice. The most common approach is for states to leave open the issue of how
nonmembers are to be notified. (New Jersey, Wisconsin, Delaware, Massachusetts.)
Contents of Notice. Hudson requires the notice to contain sufficient information

about the union's expenditures to permit a nonmember to decide whether to challenge the
calculation of the fee. Consequently, this information must be provided regardless of the
requirements of the statute. Many states that address the content of the notice describe or
reiterate the Hudson requirement in their statute or expand on it by providing greater
detail. Such detail often covers the type of financial statements, the extent or manner of
verification of expenditures required, instructions on how to object or challenge the fee,
and sometimes a description of the escrow procedures. Massachusetts even requires the
union to include with the notice a complete copy of the labor board's rules on agency fee
disputes.
Escrow. Hudson also requires that the portion of agency fees that are "reasonably

in dispute" must be placed in an escrow account pending the completion of the required
process to challenge the calculation of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker.
Without the escrow protection, the nonmember would essentially be loaning the money
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to the union while the fee dispute was decided. Again, while escrow accounts are
required by Hudson and thus need not be addressed in statute, states that legislate
specifics regarding the notice are likely to also require escrow accounts in the statute.
Some state labor boards set up escrow accounts for the parties, some states require the
employer to establish the escrow accounts (Minnesota), some require the union and the
individual employee to set one up (Massachusetts), while others just require the union to
do it.
3. Resolving Disputes About the Amount of the Fee
As the Hudson Court held, a union must provide a reasonably prompt opportunity
to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker. The union has the
burden of proving to the decisionmaker that the amount of the agency fee reflects
expenditures made for only those activities germane to collective bargaining and contract
administration. The Hudson court did not specify what kind of decisionmaker was
required or what "reasonably prompt" means, but did state in a footnote that "an
expeditious arbitration might satisfy the requirement of a reasonably prompt decision by
an impartial decisionmaker, so long as the arbitrator's selection did not represent the
Union's unrestricted choice."
Most state labor relations boards do not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes
regarding the amount of the agency service fee, although there are some notable
exceptions. In those states that do not hear these disputes at the agency level, private
arbitrators handle these cases. Among those states that do give the state board
jurisdiction over fee disputes, some have separate procedures (even a separate state
agency) while others use the same procedures for resolving fee disputes as they do for
unfair labor practices.
NEW JERSEY created a separate agency in 1979 to adjudicate disputes about the
amount of agency service fees. New Jersey's statute provides that in order to get agency
fees through payroll deduction, the union must comply with the statute's annual notice
requirements and must have in place a procedure for resolving fee dispute issues which
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provides for an appeal to the New Jersey Appeal Board. The statute provides some
assurance that the disputes are addressed in a "reasonably prompt" manner by allowing a
case to come to the appeal board if the union's internal procedure is not completed within
60 days. Also, the caseload is tempered somewhat by a statutory providing that sets the
maximum agency service fee amount at 85% of regular dues, initiation fees and
assessments.
MASSACHUSETTS has jurisdiction to decide cases on the amount of agency
service fees. The agency regulations contemplate deferral to a union's procedure that
uses an neutral decisionmaker, but it seems that Massachusetts' public sector unions all
use the less expensive (free) service offered by the labor board. The labor board had
thousands of cases in backlog pending the final resolution of the first big case in 2000 by
Massachusetts' highest court after over a decade oflitigation.
ILLINOIS. Both the education labor board and the public sector labor board have
jurisdiction over agency fee disputes. The first major case before the education labor
board required 24 days of hearings over 18 months and five years in litigation was
resolved on appeal in 1990. For some reason not immediately apparent, the public sector
labor board has very little case activity in this area.
HAWAll's labor board has jurisdiction to hear fee disputes, but there has been
little activity in the past decade.
WISCONSIN's labor board has concurrent jurisdiction with the courts to hear
agency fee disputes. Wisconsin also requires a supermajority of unit members to
authorize agency fees.
VERMONT's statute allows a nonmember employed by the state to grieve the fee
amount to the Board within 30 days of receiving the final decision of the Union's review
procedure. The labor board also has jurisdiction to hear contractual grievances of state
employees. With respect to state and judicial branch employees, the statute sets
maximum agency fee at 85% of dues. That and a grandfather provision was given as an
explanation for almost non-existent case activity on this issue.
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OHIO's labor board does not directly litigate fee disputes. The Board can review
the final decision of the impartial decisionmaker but only to determine if the decision was
arbitrary or discriminatory.
MINNESOTA's Board of Mediation has jurisdiction to hear agency fee disputes
(but, surprisingly, not unfair labor practices). The statute sets the maximum agency fee at
85% of dues.
The state labor boards in DELAWARE, PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA,
OREGON, ALASKA, WASHINGTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE, RHODE ISLAND,
CONNECTICUT, NEW YORK, MICHIGAN, MONTANA, and NEW MEXICO do not
have express statutory jurisdiction to hear agency fee disputes.

Conclusion: Approaches vary widely with no apparent pattern

The degree of involvement of state labor boards in agency fee matters and in the
resolution of disputes regarding the agency fee amount varies considerably and has no
discemable pattern. There may be an historical connection for some states: Under the
National Labor Relations Act, a union and employer may negotiate a union security
clause requiring union membership as a condition of employment, but the Act requires
the NLRB to conduct a de-authorization election upon a petition supported by 30% or
more of the unit employees. States whose labor acts closely paralleled the NLRA
generally may have found it logical to legislate agency service fee matters as well by
enacting legislation requiring an election to authorize or de-authorize agency fees.
In addition, some states are more directly involved with union affairs than states
such as Maine, which imposes no limitations or requirements on employee organizations.
Some states require unions to have a constitution and bylaws before the union can even
file a petition with the agency, while a number of others require the unions to file annual
reports or financial statements with the state agency. For states that already oversee
certain aspects of a union's finances, regulating agency fee matters may not be viewed as
a significant step. Similarly, some state labor boards are more intimately involved in the
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enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by virtue of their statutory authority to
hear grievances. All of these factors, as well as historical and normative factors such as
the extent of unionization and the prevalence of agency fee provisions generally in the
state, may have a bearing on the role of a state's labor relations board in addressing these
issues.
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